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Patently Insane for Patents: A Judge-byJudge Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s
Post-Alice Patentable Subject Matter
Eligibility of Abstract Ideas
Jurisprudence
By Matthew B. Hershkowitz*
The Information Age exposed the U.S. patent system to
patentable subject matter that it had never considered before. In
particular, software tested the courts’ understanding of patentable
subject matter under section 101 of title 35 of the U.S. Code. The
Supreme Court grappled with this issue in its Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International decision, which greatly affected the
patentability of software. However, the Supreme Court did not
define the precise contours of patentable subject matter in Alice,
and as a result, the Federal Circuit has wrestled with its meaning
ever since. This Note discusses the approaches Federal Circuit
judges apply to determine whether a patent claims patentable
subject matter. It begins by providing background regarding
patents, patent litigation, the Supreme Court’s patentable subject
matter cases prior to Alice, and then the Alice decision and its
effect. It then examines the Federal Circuit’s post-Alice decisions
implementing the two-step test Alice applied. The test first asks
whether the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea and
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then, if it is, whether the claimed invention contains an inventive
concept. Federal Circuit judges have considered different aspects
of the claimed invention in making these two determinations. As
such, this Note analyzes the Federal Circuit judges’ decisions and
discerns trends in their approaches. Relying on these patterns, this
Note next suggests to litigators how to better argue the
patentability of software before the Federal Circuit. Furthermore,
this Note posits that the Federal Circuit judges who implement
different consistent approaches in essence ask the same question,
and that the judges who do not implement a consistent approach
will likely fall in line with the judges who apply consistent
approaches. Finally, this Note predicts that the Federal Circuit
will continue to expand the definition of patentable subject matter
under Alice.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of the Information Age1 created uncertainty for the
patentability of software. As technology changed, the courts
adapted their approaches to evaluating patents and, more
specifically, how they determine whether patents claim patenteligible subject matter.2 The Supreme Court announced the Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International decision in 2014 and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has since
wrestled with the decision.3 The Alice decision applied a two-step
analysis to determine whether a patent claims patentable subject
matter, asking (1) whether the claims are directed to an abstract
idea,4 and (2) if they are so directed, whether they contain an
inventive concept.5
The Alice decision “upended”6 patent law and resulted in a
“legendary” invalidation rate of asserted patents.7 The post-Alice
uncertainty caused many in the legal field to try to decipher how
1

The information age is “the modern age regarded as a time in which information has
become a commodity that is quickly and widely disseminated and easily available
especially through the use of computer technology.” Information Age, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age (last
visited June 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N4LG-EDBW].
2
See infra Sections I.C–E.
3
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). See infra Sections I.D–E, II.B.
4
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts [i.e., abstract ideas].”). The Supreme
Court has held a variety of claimed inventions invalid as claiming patent-ineligible
subject matter. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010) (holding a patent
claiming a financial hedging process invalid as claiming an abstract idea); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (invalidating a patent claiming a mathematical formula
without an inventive concept); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)
(invalidating a patent claiming a mathematical algorithm as only applied to digital
computers); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853) (holding a claim to any
machinery using electromagnetism to mark or print characters, signs, or letters at any
distance as void).
5
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
6
Rajit Kapur et al., Certain Uncertainty: The Future of Computer Software Patents,
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=115145b7dd58-4aea-9f87-e1679cb56b24 [https://perma.cc/768L-GQAT].
7
Lewis E. Hudnell, The Wonderland of Patent Ineligibility as Litigation Defense,
LAW360 (June 5, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/662143/the-wonderland-ofpatent-ineligibility-as-litigation-defense [https://perma.cc/6SAV-ZMJM].
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courts analyze whether a patent claims patentable subject matter,
but often to no avail.8 Moreover, scholars have posited different
tests for determining whether a patent claims patentable subject
matter, or have argued how the courts should apply the Alice test.9
While scholars often consider the Federal Circuit as a whole and
suggest what the court should do, this Note examines how each
Federal Circuit judge approaches deciding patentable subject
matter eligibility post-Alice.10 The trends identified through this
examination will enable litigators to more persuasively argue for or
against patentability before Federal Circuit judges.11
This Note discerns consistent methodologies in executing the
Alice inquiry for four Federal Circuit judges.12 These judges
reliably ask the same questions within their cases when
determining whether the claimed invention is directed to an
abstract idea, and searching for an inventive concept.13 This Note
then reviews the approaches of six Federal Circuit judges who
implement different inquiries or factors in the decisions they have
authored.14 However, for these judges, as this Note highlights,
some trends exist under either Alice step one or step two.15
Understanding the Federal Circuit judges’ approaches to the Alice
inquiry will empower litigators to craft more persuasive arguments
by tailoring their arguments accordingly.16
Part I of this Note provides an understanding of the basics of
patent law,17 patent litigation,18 and the Federal Circuit,19 and then

8

See Ryan Davis, Patent Eligibility Confusion Reigns Post-Alice, Experts Say,
LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/636273/patent-eligibilityconfusion-reigns-post-alice-experts-say [https://perma.cc/Q374-7UTC].
9
See infra note 139.
10
See infra Section II.B.
11
See infra Section III.A.
12
See infra Section II.B.1.
13
See infra Section II.B.1.
14
See infra Section II.B.2.
15
See infra Section II.B.2.
16
See infra Section III.A.
17
See infra Section I.A.
18
See infra Section I.B.
19
See infra Section I.B.
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focuses on the relevant Supreme Court decisions.20 More
specifically, it reviews the Supreme Court’s patentable subject
matter decisions during the Information Age,21 and concludes with
an explanation of the Alice decision22 and its impact on patent
law.23 Part II analyzes the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the
Alice decision.24 In particular, it attempts to decipher and identify
how each judge approaches deciding patentable subject matter
issues.25 Finally, Part III provides advice to litigators on how to
more persuasively argue patentable subject matter eligibility before
the Federal Circuit,26 and then posits predictions about where the
Federal Circuit judges’ and, more generally, the Federal Circuit’s
views on patentable subject matter are heading.27
THE BASICS OF PATENT LAW, A PRIMER ON PATENT
LITIGATION, AND THE SUPREME COURT’S RELEVANT PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE
This Part provides background on patent law, patent litigation,
and the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter decisions.
Section I.A explains the patent law basics: what is a patent, why
the government grants patents, how an inventor secures a patent,
and what are the requirements to obtain a patent. Section I.B then
discusses patent litigation and the Federal Circuit. Next, Section
I.C reviews the Supreme Court’s cases deciding patentable subject
matter eligibility. Finally, Section I.D focuses on the Alice
decision, while Section I.E illuminates the challenges created by,
and the effects of, that decision.
I.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
See infra Section I.E.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
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A. Foundation of Patents and Patentable Subject Matter
The first patent was granted in 1790 for a process of making
potash, an ingredient in fertilizer.28 To date, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has granted more than nine million
patents.29 In today’s modern economy, patents are an integral part
of a company’s success and value.30
A patent is a property right granted under the Constitution to an
inventor for a limited time31 that grants the inventor “‘the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling’ the
invention in the United States or ‘importing’ the invention into the
United States.”32 The patent’s term continues for twenty years
from the date the patent application was filed or, under certain
circumstances, from the filing date of a previously filed related
application.33 Patents come in three varieties: utility patents, plant
patents, and design patents.34

28

See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, First U.S. Patent Issued Today
in 1790 (July 31, 2001), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/first-us-patentissued-today-1790 [https://perma.cc/XQN4-GS7E].
29
See U.S. Patent No. 9,554,210 (filed June 25, 2015). The patent number, which
indexes the patents issued, is over 9,500,000.
30
See Reasons for Patenting Your Inventions, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/importance/reasons.htm
[https://perma.cc/CP4N-L4DZ] (last visited July 27, 2017) (listing reasons why patents
are important to companies).
31
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
32
What Are Patents, Trademarks, Servicemarks, and Copyrights?, Section of General
Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents
[https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS] [hereinafter What are Patents?] (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1) (2012)).
33
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); see also What are Patents?, supra note 32.
34
See What Are Patents?, supra note 32. The USPTO may grant a utility patent “to
anyone who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Id.
For the purposes of this Note, only utility patents are considered and all references to
“patent” refer to utility patents.
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The exclusive right a patent provides incentivizes inventors to
create and disclose inventions.35 When the patent term expires, the
invention enters the public domain, eliminating the inventor’s
exclusive right, and allows society to freely use the invention,
which in turn benefits society by permitting further invention.36
Without patent protection, the inventor would be less incentivized
to invent and would resist disclosing the invention because the
inventor would fear someone stealing it.37
To obtain a patent, the inventor or assignee38 must file an
application with the USPTO.39 A patent application contains
several parts, but only the specification and claims are relevant to
this Note. “The specification is a written description of the
invention and of the manner and process of making and using the
invention that concludes with the claims to the invention.”40 The
claims “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter that the [inventor or inventors] regard[] as the invention.”41
The USPTO examines the application to determine whether it
satisfies the requirements under title 35 of the U.S. Code.42 The
35

See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 931 (2011)
(“Scholars recognize that the patent system benefits society not merely because of the
increased disclosure that results from patenting, but also (and primarily) because of the
incentive to invent that the patent system creates.”).
36
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009).
37
See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 196–97 (2009)
(providing that patents are a public good and without patent protection, they would
be underproduced).
38
An assignee is “[a] type of patent owner, who has had ownership transferred to her
from a previous owner such as the inventor.” Glossary, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170627184309/https://www.uspto.gov/patentsmaintaining-patent/patent-litigation/glossary [https://perma.cc/76EZ-H98Q] (last visited
June 12, 2017) [hereinafter Glossary].
39
See What are Patents?, supra note 32.
40
Specification, Section of Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Jan. 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent#heading-1
[https://perma.cc/WR9G-VQ7X].
41
Id.
42
See Patent Laws, Section of General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started
/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS].
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Manual for Patent Examining Procedure explains the examination
process.43 Specifically, the USPTO will decide whether the
invention complies with sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 of title
35.44 If the USPTO finds the application satisfactory, it grants the
applicant a patent, contingent on the payment of fees.45
Each provision under title 35 poses at least one requirement for
the invention. Briefly stated, section 101, the subject of this Note,
requires that the patent claims patentable subject matter.46 Section
102 requires that the invention is new,47 and section 103 demands
that the invention is sufficiently different from the prior art,48 such
that the invention would not be obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art49 to which the invention pertains.50 Finally,
section 112 focuses on the application’s sufficiency, requiring the
specification contain an adequate written description.51 The
specification must demonstrate that the inventor was in possession
of the invention at the time of the application, that the information
disclosed in the specification enables a person having ordinary
skill in the art to make and use the invention, and that the

43

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL FOR PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (9th ed., rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015).
44
See id. § 2103.
45
See Allowance and Issue of Patent, Section of General Information Concerning
Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patentsgetting-started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS].
46
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
47
See id. § 102.
48
See id. § 103. “Prior art consists of the references (books, articles, web pages and
other information) that are publicly available before the date that the application was
filed.” Glossary, supra note 38.
49
See 35 U.S.C. § 103. “The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person
who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention.” U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2141.03.I.
50
See 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007); Novelty and Non-Obviousness, Conditions for Obtaining a Patent, Section of
General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct.
2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents [https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS].
51
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra
note 43, § 2103.
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Section 101 defines patentable subject matter. It provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor[e],
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”53 Section
101 provides four express categories that can receive patent
protection: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.54 A process is “an act, or a series of acts or steps.”55 A
machine is “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain
devices and combination of devices,” which includes “every
mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or
result.”56 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court defined
manufacture as “the production of articles for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by
machinery.”57 The Court also defined a composition of matter in
Chakrabarty as “all compositions of two or more substances
and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of
chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be
gases, fluids, powders or solids.”58 Since Thomas Jefferson’s draft
of the 1793 Patent Act, section 101 has undergone little revision.59
Notably, Jefferson’s view that “ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement” remains intact.60 Furthermore, when Congress
52

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2103.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2103.
54
See 35 U.S.C. § 101; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2103.
55
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2106.I.i.
56
Id. § 2106.I.ii (citations omitted).
57
447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1,
11 (1931)).
58
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280
(D.D.C. 1957)).
59
See id. at 309 (explaining that the only amendment made to the Act was to replace
“art” in Jefferson’s version with “process”).
60
Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington
ed. 1871)).
53
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considered the 1952 Patent Act, it intended patentable subject
matter to “include anything under the sun that is made
by man.”61
However, the breadth of patent protection is not unlimited. The
courts have created judicial exceptions to patentable subject matter
that exclude natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas
from patentability.62 These exceptions are not new, and in fact
have existed for over 150 years.63 They protect against preemption
of the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” because it
would “‘impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’
thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws.”64
However, the Supreme Court has avoided precisely defining an
abstract idea.65
With technology moving towards software innovation and
away from mechanical inventions, the judicial exceptions have
impacted more inventions. For example, in the Industrial Age,66
61

Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923,
at 6 (1952)).
62
See id.; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
63
See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852).
64
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293). For example, Einstein could not have patented
his theory of special relativity and Newton could not have patented the law of gravity
because they both are laws of nature. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. Moreover, a
gene is not patentable because it is a natural phenomenon. See Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2120.
65
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he cases considering the patentability of program-related
inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to determine
with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will be
patentable.”). Because of the unpredictability of exactly determining whether software
technology is patentable, this Note attempts to bring some predictability to the court’s
determination by examining how each judge makes such determination.
66
Industrial Age, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries
.com/definition/industrial_age [https://perma.cc/5R4W-R889] (last visited June 12, 2017)
(defining the Industrial Age as “[a]n era marked by widespread industrialization;
specifically . . . the period in the history of the developed world from the start of the
Industrial Revolution, in the late [eighteenth] cent[ury], to the information age, in the late
[twentieth] cent[ury]”).
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patents claiming inventions not either tied to a machine or
apparatus, or transforming an article into another state or thing,
were rarely granted.67 In the Information Age, now, the abstract
idea judicial exception has severely impacted software patents
because software, although implemented on a machine, is not itself
a machine.68 Moreover, software itself does not transform some
physical substance from one form to another.69 However, the Court
opined in Bilski v. Kappos that this does not mean that software
is unpatentable.70
As the Information Age approached, the “computer
industry . . . experienced rapid growth.”71 The advent of the
Internet accelerated technological advancement.72 In 1995, less
than one percent of the world’s population used the Internet,
whereas today, around forty percent use it.73 Computers and the
Internet are now an integral part of people’s lives. People share on
social media,74 shop,75 bank,76 and even find new love interests77
online. The transition from the tangible inventions of the Industrial
Age to the Information Age’s intangible, process inventions
challenged the courts to rethink whether such inventions satisfy the

67

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
See Software, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (providing that software is
instructions that run on a computer which permits it to accept information, translate it,
and then output other information).
69
See id. (defining software as instructions implemented on a computer that translates
and then outputs data, not as something that transforms a physical substance).
70
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
71
See David C. Tunick, Has the Computer Changed the Law?, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 43, 43 (1994).
72
See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internetusers/ [https://perma.cc/SUM7-6YND] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
73
See id.
74
See generally, e.g., FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com [https://perma.cc/54FGUNMW] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (hosting virtual space for users to “post” and “share”
various media and personal information).
75
See generally, e.g., AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com [https://perma.cc/U7C79BEW] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (providing various products for online purchase).
76
See generally, e.g., TD BANK, http://www.tdbank.com [https://perma.cc/V5MV2X7H] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (providing online banking services).
77
See generally, e.g., MATCH, http://www.match.com [https://perma.cc/759Y-6SMG]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (acting as an online dating resource).
68
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patentable subject matter requirement.78 The Supreme Court has
wrestled with this patentable subject matter issue for more than
150 years.79 However, before delving into the Supreme Court’s
precedent, it is necessary to better understand the court system as it
pertains to patent infringement lawsuits.
B. Patent Litigation and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit was formed in 1982 and has nationwide
appellate jurisdiction in various subject areas, including patent
law.80 The following example best illustrates the Federal Circuit’s
role in patent litigation. Imagine that one behemoth cellular
telephone manufacturer, Apple, Inc., believes that another gigantic
cellular telephone manufacturer, Samsung Electronics, is
infringing one of its patents. Apple will file a lawsuit in one of the
U.S. District Courts81 alleging that Samsung infringed Apple’s
patent claiming a process implemented on a cellular telephone.
Samsung, in response, will likely claim as one of its defenses that
Apple’s patent is invalid because it claims patent-ineligible subject
matter—this Note’s focus.
After the district court litigation, either or both parties may
appeal the decision.82 The Federal Circuit will hear the appeal,
regardless of which district court decided the case, because the
subject matter is patent law.83 A randomly selected panel
comprising of three Federal Circuit judges will decide the appeal,84
and one of the judges will author an opinion for the panel.85 After
the Federal Circuit decision, Apple and/or Samsung may request a
78

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
See infra Section I.C.
80
Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.
cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/76MA-HTK2]
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2017).
81
The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338 (2012).
82
See FED. R. APP. P. 3.
83
See Court Jurisdiction, supra note 80.
84
Id.
85
Id. If there is disagreement between the judges, the disagreeing judge will write a
dissenting opinion.
79
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rehearing with the panel,86 request an en banc rehearing,87 or
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.88
C. The Supreme Court Case Law Determining Patentable Subject
Matter Eligibility
The Supreme Court has decided several cases regarding
patentable subject matter eligibility, and grappled with patentable
subject matter early on in the 1853 O’Reilly v. Morse case.89
However, the first Supreme Court case addressing the patentability
of abstract ideas during the Information Age was Gottschalk v.
Benson, which reviewed the validity of a mathematical algorithm90
converting binary-coded decimal91 numerals into pure binary
numerals,92 and ultimately held it ineligible.93 In deciding that the
patent did not claim patentable subject matter, the Court noted that
the claim was broad, thereby preempting both known and unknown
uses of the process, and that either a generic computer or a human
could implement the algorithm.94

86

See FED. R. APP. P. 40.
See FED. R. APP. P. 35. A rehearing en banc means that a panel consisting of “all
eligible and participating active judges, and any senior judge of the court who sat on the
panel that decided the case originally” will rehear the case. See Appellate Procedure
Guide, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, (July 2017), https://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/AppellateProcedureGuide/Decision___Post-Decision/APGrehearingandrehearingenbanc.html [https://perma.cc/7LCZ-LX7S].
88
See Court Jurisdiction, supra note 80.
89
See 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853).
90
An algorithm is a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem[.]”
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
91
See id. at 66–67 (“The [Binary-coded decimal] system using decimal numerals
replaces the character for each component decimal digit in the decimal numeral with the
corresponding four-digit binary numeral[.]”).
92
“The pure binary system of positional notation uses two symbols as digits—[zero]
and [one], placed in a numerical sequence with values based on consecutively ascending
powers of [two]. In pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is the twos
position; what would be hundreds position is in the fours position; what would be the
thousands position is the eights. Any decimal number from [zero] to [ten] can be
represented in the binary system with four digits or positions . . . .” Id. at 66.
93
See id. at 71–73.
94
See id. at 67–68.
87
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The Supreme Court elaborated on the patentability of abstract
ideas six years later in Parker v. Flook,95 a case regarding a
mathematical formula applied to a catalytic conversion process.96
There, the patent claimed three steps: (1) measure one of several
variables, (2) apply an algorithm to calculate a new limit value,
and (3) adjust an alarm limit to the new value.97 The Court held
that the addition of conventional, post-solution activity—namely,
measuring the variable and adjusting the limit—was insufficient to
convey patentability, and therefore, held that the patent claimed
patent-ineligible subject matter.98
Three years later, the Supreme Court considered whether a
patent claiming a process using a mathematical formula, the
Arrhenius equation,99 employed on a programmed computer
claimed patent-eligible subject matter, and concluded in the
affirmative.100 In Diamond v. Diehr,101 the patent claimed a
process to cure rubber.102 A computer constantly measured the
temperature inside a mold containing a rubber piece needing
curing via a temperature probe, and then inputted the data into the
Arrhenius equation, which outputted a time for curing.103 When the
calculated curing time equaled the actual time the rubber piece had

95

See 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (noting that “the only novel feature of the method is a
mathematical formula”).
96
See id. at 585. The catalytic conversion process converts “heavy hydrocarbons,
chemicals or fuels to light hydrocarbons, chemical or fuels,” the results are “less toxic,
less corrosive, more usable and more environmentally friendly,” and it is used in vehicles
to convert exhaust gas from the engine into less toxic pollutants. See Catalytic
Conversion, CORROSIONPEDIA, https://www.corrosionpedia.com/definition/1685/catalytic
-conversion [https://perma.cc/389H-5PME] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
97
See Parker, 437 U.S. at 585.
98
Id. at 586, 594.
99
The Arrhenius equation is a mathematical expression that embodies temperature’s
effect on the rate of a chemical reaction. See Arrhenius Equation, ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/Arrhenius-equation [https://perma.cc
/G5PA-CQG4] (last updated Nov. 13, 2008).
100
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 193 (1981).
101
450 U.S. 175.
102
Id. at 177–78.
103
Id. at 178–79.
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spent in the mold, the mold opened, thereby permitting removal of
the rubber piece.104
First, the Court noted that, like Gottschalk and Flook, the
Arrhenius equation was an abstract idea.105 However, in contrast to
Gottschalk and Flook, the application of the abstract idea did not
preempt the use of the equation outside of its application to the
rubber curing process, because the process’ other steps placed
meaningful limits on the claim’s breadth.106 Second, the Court
recognized that the process transformed something into another
state, namely, it changed the rubber’s properties and shape.107
Therefore, the Court concluded that the patent did not claim the
mathematical formula itself, but a new and useful application of
the formula.108
The Supreme Court did not weigh in on the eligibility of
abstract ideas again until Bilski v. Kappos nearly thirty years
later.109 In Bilski, the question was whether a patent claiming the
hedging process, a financial practice, claimed patentable subject
matter.110 To determine whether the patent claimed patentable
subject matter, the Court first compared the hedging concept to
Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr, and held that hedging was similar to
the abstract ideas in Gottschalk and Flook—in that patenting
hedging would “pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”111 The
Court then rejected Bilski’s argument that it did not preempt the
entire field because it was limited to the energy industry, finding
that such limitation was insufficient to convey patent eligibility.112
104

Id.
Id. at 186.
106
Id. at 187.
107
Id. at 192–93.
108
Id. at 191.
109
See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding a patent claiming a
financial hedging process invalid as claiming an abstract idea).
110
Id. at 3223. A hedge is “an investment to reduce the risk of adverse price
movements in an asset,” which normally “consists of taking an offsetting position in a
related security . . . .” Hedge, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge
.asp [https://perma.cc/3QWN-5AAE] (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
111
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230–31 (citations omitted).
112
See id.
105
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Therefore, the Court held, Bilski’s patent did not claim patentable
subject matter.113
D. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International
The Supreme Court most recently opined how to determine
patentable subject matter eligibility in the Alice decision.114 Alice
was the assignee of several patents relating to managing financial
risk.115 The patent at issue focused on a “computer-implemented
scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk that only one
party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a
third-party intermediary.”116 Specifically, the patent claimed a
method whereby a computer created shadow accounts reflecting
the parties’ actual balances at “‘exchange institutions’ (e.g.,
banks),” and would then only let transactions proceed if the parties
held sufficient funds in those accounts to satisfy their respective
obligations.117 CLS Bank filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that Alice’s patent claims were “invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed.”118 The district court held the claims invalid, but a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed.119 However, the Federal Circuit granted a rehearing en
banc, vacated the panel decision, and affirmed the district court
decision.120 On certiorari, the Supreme Court then addressed
whether Alice’s invention constituted patent-eligible subject
matter, and in doing so, applied the two-step analysis implemented
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,

113

See id. The Court concluded, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s decision, that the
machine-or-transformation test was not the sole test for subject matter patentability
because to hold so would violate statutory interpretation principles. Id. at 3227. The
Court, however, noted that the machine-or-transformation test is still “a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool,” for determining whether an invention is eligible for
patent protection. Id.
114
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
115
Id. at 2352.
116
Id. at 2351–52 (emphasis omitted).
117
Id. at 2352.
118
Id. at 2353.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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to determine whether Alice’s patent claimed an abstract idea, and
therefore claimed patent ineligible subject matter.121
The first step of the Alice analysis is to “determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to . . . patent-ineligible concepts.”122 If
the claims are so directed, then the analysis proceeds to step
two.123 However, if they are not, the patent claims patent-eligible
subject matter.124 Next, in step two, the court must examine each
claim at issue to “determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” 125 The inventive concept requirement
ensures that the abstract idea includes something more and is not
merely a “drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].”126
In Alice, under step one, the Court examined its jurisprudence
on patentable subject matter, specifically Gottschalk, Flook, and
Bilski, and concluded that Alice’s claims were directed to
intermediated settlement.127 Then, the Court concluded that
intermediated settlement was a “fundamental economic practice
long prevalent in our system of commerce,” like hedging in Bilski,
and therefore the claims were directed to an abstract idea.128
Under step two, the Alice court first dispensed with the notion
that implementation on a computer could provide an inventive
concept, citing Gottschalk and Flook.129 The Court also
distinguished the instant case from Diamond v. Diehr, in that the
invention in Diehr was found patentable not because of the
computer, as Alice claimed here, but because the claimed process
121

See id. at 2355–60 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289 (2012)).
122
Id. at 2355.
123
See id.
124
See id.
125
Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298). What
qualifies as an inventive concept is not clear, but how to best argue that a claimed
invention contains an inventive concept is one topic of this Note. Id.
126
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1291).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2356 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)).
129
Id. at 2357–58.
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“improved an existing technological process.”130 Finally, the steps
claimed in Alice’s patent,131 taken both individually and as an
ordered combination, were all “‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”132 In
conclusion, the Court noted that neither a generic computer nor
merely applying the abstract idea is sufficient to transform the
concept into a patent-eligible invention, and therefore, combining
the two—as Alice did by employing the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement on a computer—was likewise
insufficient.133 Thus, the Court held that Alice’s patent claimed
patent-ineligible subject matter, and was therefore invalid.134
Notably, the Alice court avoided “delimit[ing] the precise
contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category,” instead leaving it open
to the lower courts to refine.135 Similarly, the Court did not define
precisely what constitutes an “inventive concept,” only that it is
something “significantly more” than a patent on the abstract idea
itself.136 Both open questions have created uncertainty in patent

130

Id. at 2358 (discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)).
See id. at 2359 (“The representative method claim in this case recites the following
steps: (1) ‘creating’ shadow records for each counterparty to a transaction; (2)
‘obtaining’ start-of-day balances based on the parties’ real-world accounts at exchange
institutions; (3) ‘adjusting’ the shadow records as transactions are entered, allowing only
those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources; and (4) issuing
irrevocable end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the
permitted transactions.”).
132
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)).
133
See id.
134
See id. at 2360.
135
Id. at 2357.
136
See id. at 2355.
131
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litigation,137 and some scholars have opined on the proper tests to
resolve these ambiguities.138
E. The Effects of the Alice Decision
The Alice decision has had a profound effect on patent
litigation. For example, many defendants have successfully
invalidated patents asserted against them relying on the decision.139
A patent is presumed valid140 and the challenger must provide
“clear and convincing evidence” of the patent’s invalidity to
overcome that presumption.141 Despite this presumption, post-Alice
courts have invalidated patents at a “legendary rate.”142 Through
June 6, 2016, approximately two years after the Alice decision,
seventy percent of motions in federal courts claiming patent
invalidity as a defense succeeded.143 Furthermore, as compared to
the four years prior to the Alice decision, district courts have

137

See, e.g., Kapur et al., supra note 6 (opining that since the Alice decision came down
one year ago, “the world of computer software patents has been upended”); Uncertainty
Looms Over Software Patents, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON LLP (June 17, 2015),
http://www.wtplaw.com/documents/2015/06/uncertainty-looms-over-software-patents
[https://perma.cc/2BV9-DVXJ] (explaining that the USPTO has struggled for “clarity and
consistency in establishing patent eligibility for software related patents” and that
“technological innovation hangs in limbo, as patents for software related inventions are
being deemed ineligible at an excessive rate”).
138
See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 451–53 (2002) (arguing that patentable
subject matter should have the following four features: (1) “[a]n innovation filling a user
need with identifiable value”; (2) “[t]he innovation fills a need that is shared by more
than a few potential users”; (3) “[t]he innovation meets the need through [sic] regular
operations that produce consistent results”; and (4) “[t]he innovation and the results it
achieves can be described clearly and distinctly, permitting effective evaluation of the
innovation”); Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2008)
(arguing that “any invention that satisfies the Patent Act’s requirements of category,
utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and specification is patentable”).
139
See Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a Minor Case
(Part 1), FENWICK & WEST: BILSKIBLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com
/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html#_ftn14
[https://perma.cc/A9UU-6KQH].
140
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
141
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
142
Hudnell, supra note 7.
143
See Sachs, supra note 139.
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decided over four times as many patentable subject matter
invalidity defenses in the two years since the decision.144
Because the Alice decision is very recent145 and invalidity
challenges have become such a prevalent defense in patent
litigation,146 it is vital to understand how Federal Circuit judges
contemplate patentable subject matter eligibility to craft the best
strategies to argue for or against patentability. This Note examines
each Federal Circuit judge’s approach to determining patent
eligibility,147 and then recommends ways to better persuade those
judges148 to enable litigators to more convincingly argue the
patentable subject matter issue.
THE STUDY’S PARAMETERS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
JUDGES’ METHODOLOGIES
This Part defines the parameters and limitations of this Note,
and then examines the Federal Circuit’s patentable subject matter
jurisprudence. More specifically, Section II.A explains how this
Note selected the cases included in this study of the Federal
Circuit’s patentable subject matter case law, and then discloses the
limitations of the study. Section II.B reviews the cases included in
the study, judge-by-judge, and identifies trends in the judges’
approaches to determining whether a patent claims patentable
subject matter.
II.

144

Id.
Alice was decided less than four years ago from the date when this Note was being
written. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
146
See Kenneth Adamo, Comment in Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice,
LAW360 (June 17, 2016, 8:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/668773
[https://perma.cc/ETQ2-Z9BS] (quoting Kenneth Adamo, Partner at Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, saying that the Alice decision has become as prominent of a “defensive tool of
choice” as the USPTO’s new inter partes review proceeding, and that the invalidity
challenge will continue to be a quick and effective tool).
147
See infra Section II.B.
148
See infra Section III.A.
145
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A. Case Selection, Analysis Methodology, and Limitations on the
Study of the Federal Circuit’s Patentable Subject Matter
Jurisprudence
To select cases, the Author of this Note first conducted a
thorough and tailored search. The Author sought out all Federal
Circuit cases that cited to section 101, limiting the search to
decisions after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, Inc. through
April 2017. Finally, the Author reviewed each case and selected
those that evaluated whether the invention was directed to an
abstract idea. However, this Note excludes from the study any
cases where the judge was not a Federal Circuit Judge (e.g., a
judge who sat by designation149 upon the Federal Circuit), where
the decision was written per curium,150 or when the judge had
authored only one decision.
After the selection of cases, the Author then turned to
analyzing those selected. The Author groups cases together
according to the authoring judge and analyzes each case’s
reasoning to determine what factors the judge relied upon in
executing each Alice step. For example, under the first Alice step,
some judges looked at the claimed invention’s long history,151
while others noted its similarity to precedent.152 Moreover, in the
Alice step-two analysis, some judges evaluated whether the
claimed steps and equipment were generic or conventional,153
while others focused the claimed invention’s potential to preempt

149

See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1982) (“The chief judge of a circuit may designate and
assign one or more district judges within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a
division thereof whenever the business of that court so requires.”).
150
See generally FED. CIR. R. OF P. 36 (governing a “judgment of Affirmance Without
Opinion”); Glossary, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov
/content/glossary.php [https://perma.cc/RX8J-LK5J] (last visited June 24, 2017) (“Latin,
meaning ‘for the court.’ In appellate courts, often refers to an unsigned opinion.”); Rachel
Hughey, How to Get to Federal Circuit Rule 36, LAW360 (July 29, 2015, 10:19 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/684264/how-to-get-to-federal-circuit-rule-36
[https://perma.cc/UW6Y-VPYY] (providing a more in-depth discussion of Federal
Circuit Rule 36).
151
See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.1.a–b.
152
See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.1.c–d.
153
See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1.b.
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basic scientific tools.154 Often, a judge relied on multiple factors.155
For each judge, this Note details their reasoning, and then reviews
the cases’ reasoning for trends. This analysis results in discernable
trends for some judges and vague outlines for others. However, the
analysis is limited by the available body of law.
The small body of law available imposed some limitations on
this study. First, Alice was decided less than three years before the
most recent case this Note analyzes was decided, which means the
judges have not decided many cases under it, relatively
speaking.156 While some judges have decided several cases, others
have decided only a couple, and still others have decided one or no
decisions.157 Furthermore, because the judges have had limited
opportunities to decide this issue, they may not have fully
solidified their approaches and may change them in the future.158
However, this Note defines trends in Federal Circuit judges’
approaches thus far. Second, other variables likely influence the
judges’ approaches, such as the technology involved. Therefore, an
attorney arguing before the Federal Circuit on this issue must also
consider how the judges have previously reasoned in cases
involving the same technology and not solely rely on the judges’
general approaches described herein.
B. The Judges’ Approaches
Based on the results of the aforementioned analysis, this Note
then grouped the judges into two groups: judges who employ a
consistent methodology and judges who are developing their
methodology. Consistent judges have written multiple decisions
and their reasoning throughout those decisions is similar. Judges
developing their methodologies, on the other hand, have written
multiple decisions, but the factors considered in their reasoning in
those cases did not agree.
154

See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1.a.
See infra Section II.B.
156
The Alice decision was announced on June 19, 2014. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
157
This Note cannot discern trends for judges who authored one or no decisions, and
therefore, this Note does not discuss the decisions written by these judges.
158
See infra Section II.B.2.
155
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1. Judges Employing Consistent Approaches
This Note argues that some Federal Circuit judges have
developed consistent methodologies to determine whether a patent
claimed patentable subject matter. For example, despite the
relatively limited number of cases the Federal Circuit has decided
regarding an abstract idea’s subject matter eligibility, four Federal
Circuit judges—Raymond T. Chen, Richard G. Taranto, Todd M.
Hughes, and Kara F. Stoll—have decided multiple cases by
consistently applying their own approach.
a. Judge Raymond T. Chen
i. Judge Chen’s Decisions
Judge Chen159 has written decisions in four cases on this topic
and has developed a consistent methodology.160 As will be seen,
under step one, Judge Chen asks whether the claimed process has
been long-prevalent. Then, under step two, he asks whether the
steps and components are conventional or generic, and
occasionally whether the claim’s scope is sufficiently narrowed.
Judge Chen first decided DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com,
L.P.161 There, the Federal Circuit considered whether a patent
claiming a “system [that] generates and directs [a website] visitor
to a composite web page that displays product information from [a]
third-party merchant, but retains the host website’s ‘look and feel’”
claimed patentable subject matter.162 Under Alice step one, Judge
Chen noted that the claimed invention was not a mathematical
algorithm or a long-prevalent commercial practice.163 Judge
Chen’s step-one analysis here asked both whether the practice has
159

Judge Chen was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2013
by President Barack Obama and, prior to his appointment, Judge Chen was the Deputy
General Counsel for Intellectual Property Law, and Solicitor at the USPTO from 2008 to
2013. Raymond T. Chen, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/raymond-t-chen [https://perma.cc/67T7-94HU] (last
visited June 24, 2017).
160
See infra Sections II.B.1.a.i–ii.
161
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
162
Id. at 1248–49.
163
Id. at 1257.
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been long prevalent, and indirectly compared it to Supreme Court
precedent in Gottschalk and Bilski.164 As Judge Chen developed
his methodology, as demonstrated below, he focused his Alice
step-one inquiry on whether the practice is long prevalent.
Ultimately in DDR, Judge Chen commented that discerning
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea is very difficult.165
Judge Chen then deferred to Alice step two because, regardless of
how the abstract idea was described, under Alice step two, he could
identify an inventive concept.166
Under Alice step two, Judge Chen found that the claimed steps
were unconventional, explaining that conventionally when an
advertisement is displayed on a website, and a website visitor
clicks the advertisement, he or she leaves the original website and
is transported to a third party’s website.167 On the other hand,
DDR’s claimed steps transported the website visitor to a hybrid
webpage with the look and feel of the original website, but still
allowed the visitor to access the third-party website’s content,
thereby minimizing the number of visitors lost to other websites.168
Next, Judge Chen explained that the claimed invention did not
preempt every application of increasing sales by making websites
appear similar—only a “specific way” to create a composite
website to solve a problem particular to the internet.169 Thus, Judge
Chen held that the patent contained an inventive concept, and was
not invalid.170
A few weeks later, Judge Chen decided another case
challenging a patent as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter in
Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association.171 The challenged claimed invention was a
method of scanning, recognizing, and storing specific data from
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

See id.
See id. at 1255, 1257.
See id. at 1257.
See id.
See id. at 1257–58.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
See 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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hard copy documents.172 Judge Chen agreed with the district court
decision that process was “undisputedly” well-known.173 Indeed,
people had always performed those functions.174 Therefore, Judge
Chen concluded that the claimed invention was directed to an
abstract idea.175
Under step two, Judge Chen found that the claimed invention
did not contain an inventive concept.176 First, Content Extraction
conceded that scanning the documents was well-known at the time
it filed the patent.177 Second, Judge Chen rejected Content
Extraction’s argument that their application was limited to a
technological environment, countering that precedent had held
such an imposed limitation “insufficient to save a claim in this
context.”178 Thus, Judge Chen held that the claimed invention did
not contain an inventive concept, and therefore the patent
was invalid.179
Judge Chen next faced this issue in BASCOM Global Internet
Services v. AT&T Mobility, Corp.,180 where the court considered
whether a patent claiming a process “provid[ing] individually
customizable filtering at [a] remote ISP server” claimed patenteligible subject matter.181 Judge Chen agreed with the district court
172

See id. at 1345.
Id. at 1347.
174
See id. (pointing out that “banks ha[d], for some time, reviewed checks, recognized
relevant data such as the amount, account number, and identity of account holder, and
stored that information in their records”).
175
See id. at 1347–48.
176
See id. at 1348.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
See id. at 1347–48, 1351.
180
See 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
181
Id. at 1344. In the “filtering content” process:
[T]he ISP server receives a request to access a website, associates the
request with a particular user, and identifies the requested website.
The filtering tool then applies the filtering mechanism associated
with the particular user to the requested website to determine whether
the user associated with that request is allowed access to the website.
The filtering tool returns either the content of the website to the user,
or a message to the user indicating that the request was denied.
Id. at 1345.
173
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that “filtering content [was] an abstract idea because it [was] a
longstanding, well-known method of organizing human
behavior . . . .”182 He also noted that filtering content was similar to
other inventions that the Federal Circuit found directed to an
abstract idea.183 Then, Judge Chen commented on how challenging
it is to discern what an invention is directed to and deferred to
Alice step two for considering the specific claim limitations.184
Under step two, he found an inventive concept because the
steps’ order was unconventional.185 Judge Chen agreed with the
district court that none of the steps alone constituted an inventive
concept, but disagreed with the district court that the steps as an
ordered combination did not contain an inventive concept.186 He
found that, because BASCOM’s invention filtered at a remote
location as opposed to a central location, and therefore in different
order than the conventional process, the claimed invention
contained an inventive concept.187 He also noted that the claims
did not preempt any way of filtering internet content, but instead,
recited “a specific, discrete implementation” of the abstract idea,188
and upheld the patent.189
Finally, the most recent decision Judge Chen authored on this
topic was Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.190 There, the
patent claimed a type of “logic circuit design process.”191 Judge
Chen concluded that the design process was a mental process, i.e.,
something that humans do.192 Therefore, he held that the claimed
invention was directed to an abstract idea.193 In his Alice step-two
analysis, he found that the steps were directed to a mental process
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id. at 1349.
See id. at 1350.
See id. at 1349–50.
See id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1139.
See id. at 1139.
Id. at 1151.
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and did not “introduce a technical advance or improvement.”194
Therefore, he held that the claimed invention did not contain an
inventive concept and that the patent was invalid.195
ii. Summary of Judge Chen’s Approach
In the above review of Judge Chen’s decisions, Judge Chen
consistently approached the question of whether a patent claimed
patent-eligible subject matter. In the Alice step-one analysis, he
inquired whether the claimed invention was a long-prevalent
practice.196 Under Alice step two, he inquired whether the claimed
invention’s steps were conventional, and occasionally whether the
claim’s scope was sufficiently limited.197
b. Judge Richard G. Taranto
i. Judge Taranto’s Decisions
Judge Taranto198 takes the same approach as Judge Chen, and
has written two decisions on patentable subject matter.199 Judge
Taranto’s first post-Alice decision was buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., where the court considered whether a patent claiming
“methods and machine-readable media encoded to perform steps
for guaranteeing a party’s performance of its online transaction”
claimed patentable subject matter.200 Judge Taranto concluded that
the process created a contractual relationship, which was “beyond
question of ancient lineage,” and held that the claimed invention
was directed to an abstract idea.201
194

Id. at 1152.
Id.
196
See supra Section II.B.1.a.i.
197
See supra Section II.B.1.a.i.
198
Judge Taranto was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2013
by President Barack Obama and, prior to his appointment, he practiced law at Farr &
Taranto. Richard G. Taranto, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/richard-g-taranto
[https://perma.cc/9VTV-CFKF]
(last visited June 24, 2017).
199
See Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
200
buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1351.
201
Id. at 1355.
195
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Under step two of Alice, Judge Taranto noted that the steps
were generic, including the claimed computer.202 Then, he rejected
that limiting the claimed invention’s application to online
transactions was sufficient to save the claim because precedent
specifically denied that assertion.203 Therefore, he held the
patent invalid.204
Nearly two years later, Judge Taranto wrote another decision
deciding whether a patent claimed an abstract idea. In Electric
Power Group, L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., the court considered whether
a patent claiming systems and methods for monitoring electric
power grids by collecting data, analyzing it, and displaying the
results claimed patentable subject matter.205 Judge Taranto
concluded that the claimed invention was a mental process, which
the Federal Circuit has held to be an abstract idea.206 Thus, Judge
Taranto held the claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.207
Under step two, Judge Taranto noted that “limiting the claim[]
to the particular technological environment” did not transform the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application of the abstract
idea.208 Next, he concluded that the steps were ordinary because
the claimed invention was no different from the mental process and
did not recite anything innovative.209 Therefore, Judge Taranto
concluded that the claimed invention would preempt every
application of the abstract idea and was not a specific application
of the abstract idea.210 Thus, he held the patent invalid.211

202

See id.
See id.
204
See id.
205
See Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
206
See id. at 1353–54.
207
See id. at 1354.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 1355 (explaining that the claimed invention failed to provide an “inventive set
of components or methods . . . that would generate new data” to “invoke any assertedly
inventive programming” to involve an unconventional ordering of steps, or to use any
unconventional equipment).
210
See id. at 1355–56.
211
See id. at 1356.
203
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ii. Summary of Judge Taranto’s Approach
In summary, while Judge Taranto has written only two
decisions on the matter, his approach was relatively defined. Under
the first step of Alice, Judge Taranto asked whether the claimed
invention was a long-prevalent practice.212 In his step-two analysis,
he asked whether the claimed steps were conventional and the
claimed components were generic, and occasionally whether the
claimed invention’s scope was sufficiently narrow.213
c. Judge Todd M. Hughes
i. Judge Hughes’ Decisions
Judge Hughes214 takes a different approach than Judges Chen
and Taranto. Instead of asking whether the invention was a longstanding practice under Alice step one, Judge Hughes compares the
instant invention to the Supreme Court’s and the Federal Circuit’s
precedents. Under Alice step two, Judge Hughes examines whether
the claimed steps are conventional and the claimed components
are generic.
Judge Hughes has written five decisions deciding patentable
subject matter eligibility.215 The first post-Alice decision he wrote
on this topic was Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, a nonprecedential216 decision.217 There, the court considered whether a
212

See id. at 1353–54; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
213
See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354.
214
Judge Hughes was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2013
by President Barack Obama and, prior to his appointment, he was the Deputy Director of
the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice. Todd. M. Hughes, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR FED. THE CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/todd-m-hughes [https://perma.cc/GE5K-PNSD]
(last visited June 24, 2017).
215
See TDE Petroleum Data Sols., Inc. v. AKM Enter., Inc., 657 Fed. App’x 991 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, L.L.C. v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, No. 2013-1663 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 26, 2014).
216
Although this case as well as others later discussed are non-precedential, they are
still indicative of the author’s approach to deciding patentable subject matter
eligibility decisions.
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patent claiming a computer-aided management of bingo games
claimed patentable subject matter.218 Judge Hughes first noted that
the patents simply computerized a mental process.219 Next, Judge
Hughes compared the claims at issue with those found ineligible in
Bilski and Alice, concluding that they were analogous, and held the
claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.220 Turning to Judge
Hughes’ Alice step-two analysis, he noted that the claim recited a
generic computer and the computer’s function was purely
conventional.221 Therefore, he held the patent invalid.222
While Judge Hughes relied on both mental process and
comparing to precedent in Planet Bingo under his Alice step-one
analysis, his ultimate approach focuses more on precedential
comparison, as he did in OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc.223 In OIP Technologies, the Federal Circuit analyzed a patent
claiming “a method of price optimization in an e-commerce
environment.”224 Judge Hughes found the claimed invention
similar to the “fundamental economic concepts” in the Supreme
Court’s and Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.225 Therefore, Judge
Hughes held the claimed invention was directed to an
abstract idea.226
Under his step-two analysis, Judge Hughes focused on whether
the claimed invention’s steps or computer were conventional,
concluding that they were.227 He explained that the steps the
217

Planet Bingo, slip op. at 1.
See id. slip op. at 2.
219
See id. slip op. at 3–4.
220
See id. slip op. at 5 (discussing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) and
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356–57 (2014)).
221
See id. slip op. at 6.
222
See id. slip op. at 6–7.
223
See 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
224
Id. at 1360.
225
Id. at 1362–63. Specifically, Judge Hughes cited to Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014), Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231
(2010), Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C.,
772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire
Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Id.
226
See OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63.
227
Id. at 1364.
218
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computer executed were “well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies] previously known to the industry.”228 He also noted that
the claims’ scopes were “exceptionally broad” and implementing
them on a computer minimally limited their scopes.229 Thus, Judge
Hughes held the patent did not contain an inventive concept and
was therefore invalid.230
Next, Judge Hughes wrote the first decision finding a claimed
software invention not directed to an abstract idea in Enfish, L.L.C.
v. Microsoft, Corp.231 The claimed invention was a “selfreferential” database.232 Judge Hughes distinguished the claimed
invention from precedent, finding that the instant claims focused
on improving the computer’s functionality.233 He further explained
that the claims were “specifically directed to a self-referential table
for a computer database.”234 Accordingly, Judge Hughes held that
the claimed invention was not invalid because it was not directed
to an abstract idea.235
Five days later, Judge Hughes again authored a decision
concerning patentable subject matter eligibility. In re TLI
Communications LLC examined a patent claiming “a method and
system for taking, transmitting, and organizing digital images.”236
228
229
230
231
232

Id. at 1363 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359).
Id.
See id. at 1364.
See 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1330. The patents at issue:
[A]re directed to an innovative logical model for a computer
database. A logical model is a model of data for a computer database
explaining how the various elements of information are related to one
another. A logical model generally results in the creation of particular
tables of data, but it does not describe how the bits and bytes of those
tables are arranged in physical memory devices. Contrary to
conventional logical models, the patented logical model includes all
data entities in a single table, with column definitions provided by
rows in that same table. The patents describe this as the ‘selfreferential’ property of the database.

Id.
233

See id. at 1336.
Id. at 1337 (emphasis in original).
235
See id. at 1339. Note that because Judge Hughes found that the claimed invention
was not directed to an abstract idea, he did not reach the second step of Alice. See id.
236
823 F.3d 607, 609 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
234
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Judge Hughes first distinguished the claimed invention from the
invention in Enfish, concluding that the claimed invention was
directed to using “conventional or generic technology in a . . .
well-known environment.”237 Judge Hughes then distinguished the
instant invention from the invention in Diamond v. Diehr because
the claimed invention was “not directed to . . . sol[ving a] . . .
technological problem.”238 Finally, Judge Hughes analogized the
instant invention to other precedent, finding them similar,239 and
concluded that TLI’s claimed invention was directed to an abstract
idea.240 Under step two, Judge Hughes examined each component
to determine whether the component itself or its function was an
inventive concept and concluded that the functions and
components were conventional.241 Therefore, he held the
patent invalid.242
The most recent decision Judge Hughes authored, TDE
Petroleum Data Solutions, Inc. v. AKM Enterprises,243 followed
the same approach as his previous decisions. In TDE Petroleum
Data Solutions, the Federal Circuit determined whether a patent
claiming “processing sensor data on an oil well drill” claimed
patentable subject matter.244 Judge Hughes compared the instant
invention to the invention in Electric Power Group, and held that
precedent clearly supported that the data collection and processing
claim were directed to an abstract idea.245 In his search for an
inventive concept under Alice step two, Judge Hughes found that
there was nothing in the steps themselves or in their ordered
237

Id. at 612.
Id. at 613 (referencing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)).
239
Id. (analogizing the instant invention specifically to the abstract idea inventions in
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One
Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and Content Extraction & Transmission
L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
240
See id.
241
Id. at 613–15.
242
Id. at 615.
243
657 Fed. App’x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
244
Id. at 992.
245
Id. at 993 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
238
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combination that constituted an inventive concept, and that the
claimed component’s functions were conventional.246 He therefore
held the patent invalid.247
ii. Summary of Judge Hughes’ Approach
In sum, Judge Hughes’ approach is identifiable from his five
decisions. First, under step one, Judge Hughes compared the
invention at hand to the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s
precedent to determine whether the claimed invention was directed
to an abstract idea.248 Then, under step two, he asked whether the
claimed invention’s components were generic and whether the
steps were conventional.249
d. Judge Kara F. Stoll
i. Judge Stoll’s Decisions
Judge Stoll takes a similar approach as Judge Hughes. Judge
Stoll250 has authored two decisions determining whether a patent
claiming software claimed patent eligible subject matter.251 In her
first authored decision, In re Smith, the Federal Circuit considered
whether a patent claiming “a wagering game utilizing real or
virtual standard playing cards” claimed patentable subject
matter.252 Judge Stoll analogized the claimed invention to the
invention in Alice, concluding that a wagering game was
essentially a “fundamental economic practice”253 because the
players effectively exchanged and resolved financial obligations
246

Id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
248
See supra Section II.B.1.c.i.
249
See supra Section II.B.1.c.i.
250
Judge Stoll was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2014 by
President Barack Obama and, prior to her appointment, she practiced law at Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner. See Kara Fernandez Stoll, Circuit Judge, COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kara-farnandezstoll-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/TS4K-RMAN] (last visited June 24, 2017).
251
See FairWarning IP, L.L.C. v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re
Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
252
In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 817.
253
Id. at 818 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014)).
247
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through the game.254 She then compared it to other precedent,
finding the claimed invention to be similar to claims held to be
directed to abstract ideas, and consequently held the claimed
invention directed to an abstract idea.255 Next, in her search for an
inventive concept, Judge Stoll explained that shuffling physical
playing cards did not, as Smith argued, supply an inventive
concept because it was a conventional activity.256 Therefore, she
held that the patent claimed patent-ineligible subject matter.257
Judge Stoll next authored a decision in FairWarning IP, L.L.C.
v. Iatric Systems, Inc. where the Federal Circuit decided whether a
patent claiming “ways to detect fraud and misuse by identifying
unusual patterns in users’ access of sensitive data” claimed patent
eligible subject matter.258 Judge Stoll first compared the claimed
invention to the Federal Circuit’s precedent, concluding that the
claimed invention was essentially a combination of three
precedents, all of which were found to be directed to abstract ideas
in Electric Power Group.259 Next, Judge Stoll distinguished the
instant case from McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America,
Inc.,260 concluding that FairWarning’s invention implemented an
old practice, whereas McRo’s invention applied a new practice.261
Similarly, Judge Stoll distinguished FairWarning’s invention from
the Enfish invention, pointing out that FairWarning’s invention
was not directed to improving a computer’s functioning as was the
case with Enfish’s invention.262 Judge Stoll thus held that the
claimed invention was directed to an abstract idea.263
254

See id. at 818–19.
See id. at 819 (comparing the instant invention to Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3230–21 (2010), OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2015), and Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
256
See id.
257
See id. at 819–20.
258
839 F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
259
Id. at 1093–94 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
260
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
261
See FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1094–95.
262
See id. at 1095 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336–37
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
263
See id.
255
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Judge Stoll then conducted a thorough search for an inventive
concept under Alice step two. First, Judge Stoll rejected
FairWarning’s argument that the use of a user interface and
microprocessor conveyed an inventive concept because precedent
had categorized both of those components as generic computer
elements that did not convey inventive concepts.264 Next, Judge
Stoll rejected another FairWarning argument that the claimed
invention’s ability to combine various data sources and formats
conveyed an inventive concept, once again relying on precedent,
and therefore the functionality did not provide an inventive
concept.265 Finally, Judge Stoll distinguished FairWarning’s
claimed invention from the invention in DDR, concluding that it
did not solve a problem unique to computer technology and that
limiting the application to computers did not provide an inventive
concept.266 Thus, Judge Stoll held the patent invalid.267
ii. Summary of Judge Stoll’s Approach
To summarize Judge Stoll’s methodology, she compared the
claimed invention to the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s
precedent when deciding whether it was directed to an abstract
idea.268 Then, in her search for an inventive concept under step
two, she evaluated whether the claimed steps were conventional
and the components were generic.269
e. Summary of Consistent Judges
In conclusion, these four judges had consistent methodologies
to determine whether a patent claims patent-eligible subject matter.
Under the first step of the Alice test, there were two approaches.
Judges Chen and Taranto asked whether the invention was a long264

See id. at 1096.
See id. at 1096–97. The precedent provided that “merely selecting information, by
content or source, for collection, analysis, and [announcement] does nothing significant
to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes.” Id. at 1097 (alteration in
original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355).
266
See id at 1096–97.
267
See id. at 1098.
268
See id. at 1093–95; In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
269
See FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1095–97; In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 819.
265
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prevalent practice, while Judges Hughes and Stoll compared the
instant claimed invention to the Supreme Court’s and Federal
Circuit’s precedents. For the second step of the Alice test, however,
all four judges followed a similar methodology: asking whether the
claimed steps were unconventional or the components were not
generic. The only exception to this general guideline was that
Judges Chen and Taranto also occasionally examined whether the
claimed scope was sufficiently limited under Alice step two.
2. Judges Developing Their Methodologies
While Judges Chen, Taranto, Hughes and Stoll have decided
several cases and have defined a methodology for determining
whether a patent claims patentable subject matter, others have not
precisely outlined their approaches yet. In this Part, this Note
examines decisions by Judges Plager, Reyna, Bryson, Prost,
Lourie, and Newman to identify trends within their approaches
despite their varying approaches within those decisions.
a. Judge S. Jay Plager
i. Judge Plager’s Decisions
Judge Plager270 first wrote a decision concerning patentable
subject matter in Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP
America, Inc., where the court considered whether patents
claiming a “WHO/WHAT” pricing method claimed patentable
subject matter.271 Judge Plager compared Versata’s claimed
inventions to precedent, finding them similar to the inventions held
directed to abstract ideas in Alice and Bilski, and ultimately
concluded that Versata’s claimed inventions are directed to the
abstract idea of price determination.272 He also noted that a patent
on price determination would preempt a foundational idea, and that
270

Judge Plager was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1989
by President George H. W. Bush and, prior to his appointment, he served in the
Executive Office of the President. S. Jay Plager, COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/s-jay-plager-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc
/5NGC-5L93] (last visited June 24, 2017).
271
See 793 F.3d 1306, 1311–13 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
272
See id. at 1333.
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Federal Circuit precedent had held similar claims directed to
abstract ideas.273 Thus he held the claimed invention directed to an
abstract idea.274
Moving to step two, Judge Plager examined the claimed
inventions and concluded that when taken either individually or as
an ordered combination, the claims recited only conventional
steps.275 He further explained that Versata’s invention was similar
to other cases in which the Federal Circuit found that the
inventions lacked an inventive concept,276 and was distinguishable
from DDR.277 Judge Plager therefore held the patent invalid.278
Judge Plager’s second case concerning patentable subject
matter eligibility was Amdocs (Israel.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., where the court decided the validity of several related patents
claiming essentially the same system allowing “network service
providers to account for and bill for internet protocol (‘IP’)
network communications.”279 Judge Plager did not delve into
whether the claims were directed to an abstract idea because he
opined that even if he were to agree with the district court’s
determination that the inventions were so directed, the patent
claims still contained an inventive concept, and therefore claimed
patentable subject matter.280 Judge Plager found an inventive
concept in that the claimed inventions allowed de-centralized
processing of information, whereas the conventional process
claimed centralized processing.281 Therefore, even though the
273

See id. at 1333–34.
See id. at 1333.
275
See id. at 1334.
276
See id. Specifically, Judge Plager found the claimed invention similar to those held
directed to an abstract idea in Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, National Association, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2014), Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
277
See Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334.
278
See id. at 1336.
279
841 F.3d 1288, 1291–93 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
280
See id. at 1300.
281
See id. at 1300–01.
274
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components were generic, they operated unconventionally to
improve a computer’s functionality.282 He then distinguished the
instant case from Content Extraction, In re TLI Communications,
and DigiTech Image Technologies, L.L.C. v. Electronics for
Imaging, Inc.,283 but found it similar to DDR and BASCOM.284 For
those reasons, and similar reasons for the other patents, the judge
held the patents not invalid.285
ii. Summary of Judge Plager’s Approach
In summary, because Judge Plager did not need to address the
first step of the Alice test in Amdocs,286 only one data point exists
for the judge’s approach to determining whether a claimed
invention is directed to an abstract idea. Therefore, this Note
cannot define Judge Plager’s Alice step-one methodology.
However, Judge Plager consistently analyzed the claimed
invention under Alice step two in both his decisions; he asked first
whether the steps were unconventional and the components were
generic, and then compared the instant case to precedent.287
b. Judge Jimmie V. Reyna
i. Judge Reyna’s Decisions
Judge Reyna288 has authored four decisions deciding whether a
patent claims patentable subject matter. His first decision, McRO,
Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., held a patent claiming
“automating part of a preexisting 3–D animation method” not

282

See id.
758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
284
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300–02.
285
See id. at 1302, 1304–06.
286
See id. at 1300.
287
See id. at 1300–02; Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
288
Judge Reyna was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2011
by President Barack Obama and was an international trade attorney at Williams Mullen
prior to his appointment. Jimmie V. Reyna, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/jimmie-v-reyna-circuit-judge [https://
perma.cc/BB74-KF8W] (last visited June 24, 2017).
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invalid under Alice step one.289 Judge Reyna noted that the claimed
invention used a specific set of rules and that it allowed computers
to produce more realistic and accurate animations that previously
only humans could create.290 Therefore, Judge Reyna concluded
that McRO’s claimed invention was not directed to an abstract idea
and the patent was not invalid.291
Judge Reyna next authored the Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.
opinion and held the claims, both independent and dependent,
invalid.292 The court analyzed patents claiming one menu that has
“categories and items, and software that can generate a second
menu from that first menu by allowing categories and items to be
selected.”293 Under Alice step one, Judge Reyna found that the
claimed invention claimed the idea of creating a second menu, not
a specific way of programming or designing the software to create
the second menu.294 He also distinguished Ameranth’s invention
from Enfish.295 Thus, he held the patent claims directed to an
abstract idea.296 Under step two, Judge Reyna concluded that all
four of the features Ameranth identified as unconventional were
“insignificant post-solution activities that do not support the
invention having an ‘inventive concept.’”297 Therefore, he held
these claims invalid.298 Judge Reyna applied the same
methodology to the dependent claims and likewise held
those invalid.299
In a non-precedential decision, Judge Reyna again confronted
the patentable subject matter eligibility issue in Clarilogic, Inc. v.
FormFree Holdings Corp., where the court decided whether a
289

837 F.3d 1299, 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
See id. at 1313.
291
See id. at 1316.
292
See 842 F.3d 1229, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
293
Id. at 1234.
294
See id. at 1241.
295
See id. (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)).
296
See id.
297
Id. at 1242 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 73 (2012)).
298
See id.
299
See id. at 1243–45.
290

150

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

patent claiming “a method for electronically certifying a potential
borrower’s financial account data and providing a credit report”
claimed patentable subject matter.300 Under Alice step one, Judge
Reyna found the instant case analogous to the claim directed to an
abstract idea in Electric Power Group, and therefore concluded
that the claimed invention was also directed to an abstract idea.301
In his Alice step-two analysis, Judge Reyna first distinguished the
instant case from Diehr because the instant case did not, as
FormFree claimed, transform something into something else.302
Judge Reyna then analogized the claimed invention to the
invention found to lack an inventive concept in Electric Power
Group, and thus concluded that FormFree’s invention likewise
lacked an inventive concept.303 Thus, the patent was invalid.304
Judge Reyna’s most recent authored decision was
RecogniCorp, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., where the court considered
the validity of a patent claiming a “method and apparatus for
building a composite facial image using constituent parts.”305 In
determining whether the claimed invention was directed to an
abstract idea, Judge Reyna first noted that the method was “an
abstract concept long utilized to transmit information.”306 Next, he
distinguished the instant case from Diehr and Enfish, and
analogized RecogniCorp’s invention to the Digitech invention,
which was held directed to an abstract idea.307 Thus, he held the
claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.308 Under step two,
Judge Reyna found that adding a mathematical equation to change
data to another form did not provide an inventive concept.309
Furthermore, Judge Reyna continued, there was no particularized
application, both because the claim did not require a computer, and
300

No. 2016-1781, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2017).
See id. slip op. at 6–7 (citation omitted).
302
See id. slip op. at 7–8 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)).
303
See id. slip op. at 8 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353–56 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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See id.
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855 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Id. at 1326.
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See id. at 1326–27.
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a person could verbally perform it.310 Therefore, Judge Reyna
concluded that the claimed invention lacked an inventive concept,
and held the patent invalid.311
ii. Summary of Judge Reyna’s Approach
In sum, Judge Reyna’s approach to determining whether a
patent claimed patentable subject matter was not consistent
throughout the decisions. In one case, under Alice step one, Judge
Reyna looked at whether the patent claimed a result as opposed to
a way of achieving that result,312 but in other cases he looked at
whether the practice was long prevalent313 or compared the instant
case to Federal Circuit precedent.314 Judge Reyna was somewhat
consistent in his step-two analysis, but not entirely. In one case, he
examined whether the claimed components and steps were
conventional or generic.315 In another case, Judge Reyna compared
the case at hand to precedent.316 In yet another case, Judge Reyna
decided that the addition of a mathematical formula did not convey
an inventive concept and that the invention did not require a
computer for a human to perform the claimed process.317
Therefore, while there are some discernable trends, Judge Reyna’s
approach was not the same in every decision.
c. Judge William C. Bryson
i. Judge Bryson’s Decisions
Judge Bryson318 authored two related decisions in Affinity Labs
of Texas, L.L.C. v. DIRECTV, L.L.C.319 and Affinity Labs of Texas,
310

See id.
See id.
312
See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
313
See RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1326; McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
314
See Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., No. 2016-1781, slip op. at 6–7
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2017).
315
See Apple, 842 F.3d at 1242.
316
See Clarilogic, slip op. at 8.
317
See RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1328.
318
Judge Bryson was appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1994, and was with the
U.S. Department of Justice prior to his appointment. William C. Bryson, Circuit Judge,
311
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L.L.C. v. Amazon.com Inc.320 In DIRECTV, the court considered
whether a patent claiming a system and method for “streaming
regional broadcast signals to cellular telephones located outside the
region served by the regional broadcaster” claimed patent-eligible
subject matter.321 Judge Bryson held the claimed invention directed
to the abstract idea of “providing out-of-region access to regional
broadcast content,” because it was a long-prevalent practice and
the claims did not specify a specific way of accomplishing the
result, only the result itself.322 Furthermore, he explained that
limiting the application to cellular phones did not sufficiently limit
the claim scope.323 Finally, he noted that Affinity’s claimed
invention was similar to the inventions in In re TLI
Communications and Ultramercial, and distinguishable from those
in DDR and Enfish.324 Thus, he held the patent claim directed to an
abstract idea.325 Under step two, Judge Bryson held that the
claimed invention did not contain an inventive concept because the
components were conventional and the cellular phones’ functions
were generic.326 He also noted the similarities between the instant
case and Ultramercial, Mortgage Grader, and Intellectual
Ventures, and distinguished the instant case from BASCOM.327
Thus, he held the patent invalid.328
Affinity Labs of Texas, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com Inc. focused on
whether a patent claiming “‘a method for targeted advertising’ in
which an advertisement is selected for delivery to the user of a
portable device based on at least one piece of demographic
information about the user” claimed patent-eligible subject
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges
/william-c-bryson-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/A4UM-BY53] (last visited June
26, 2017).
319
838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
320
838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
321
DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1255.
322
Id. at 1258.
323
See id. at 1258–59.
324
See id. at 1260–62.
325
See id. at 1258.
326
See id. at 1262–63.
327
See id. at 1263–65.
328
See id. at 1265.

2017]

PATENTLY INSANE FOR PATENTS

153

matter.329 To determine whether the claimed invention was
directed to an abstract idea, Judge Bryson first compared the
instant invention to the inventions in Ultramercial and In re TLI
Communications, finding them to be similar.330 He next rejected
Affinity’s contention that wireless streaming of media was not
conventional on the application’s filing date, explaining that the
patent does not claim a specific mechanism for wirelessly
streaming media, only the function of wirelessly streaming
media.331 Judge Bryson then distinguished the instant case from
Enfish, finding that the claimed invention merely added
conventional components to well-known business practices.332
Thus, he held the patent claim directed to an abstract idea.333
Under Alice step two, Judge Bryson noted that the features in the
claims were described and claimed generically, i.e., not
specifically enough to demonstrate that the claimed invention
provided a “concrete solution” to a problem.334 Thus, he held that
the patent failed to contain an inventive concept and the patent
was invalid.335
ii. Summary of Judge Bryson’s Approach
This Note cannot precisely delineate Judge Bryson’s approach
from these two cases because his approach was not entirely
consistent in both decisions, despite the two cases being related.
However, notably, under both Alice test steps, Judge Bryson
compared the instant case to precedent.336 However, under step
one, he also looked at whether it was a long prevalent practice,337
whether the patent claimed a result or a way to achieve the
329

838 F.3d 1266, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 8,688,085 (filed Apr.
1, 2013)).
330
See id. at 1269.
331
See id.
332
See id. at 1270 (quoting Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
333
See id. at 1271.
334
Id.
335
See id. at 1272.
336
See Affinity Labs of Tex., L.L.C. v. DIRECTV, L.L.C., 838 F.3d 1253, 1260–62
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Amazon.com, 838 F.3d at 1269–71.
337
See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258; Amazon, 838 F.3d at 1270.
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result,338 and whether the claims sufficiently limited the patent’s
preemptive effect.339 Under Alice step two, he also followed the
same approach as other judges in asking whether the claimed steps
and the components included therein were generic or
conventional.340 However, under step two, Judge Bryson also
compared the instant case to precedent in DIRECTV.341 Therefore,
although Judge Bryson consistently considered certain factors, the
exact factors were not consistent in each of his decisions.
d. Judge Sharon Prost
i. Judge Prost’s Decisions
Judge Prost342 has written four decisions regarding patentable
subject matter. Two of the decisions are non-precedential, and the
other two are related proceedings. Judge Prost’s first authored
decision was in Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., a
non-precedential decision where the Federal Circuit decided
whether a patent claiming an automatically migrating
configuration setting from an old computer to a new computer
claimed patentable subject matter.343 Under Alice step one, it was
undisputed that migration of configuration setting was an abstract
idea.344 Under step two, Judge Prost noted that humans could
perform the task the patent claimed, and that the steps—taken
individually or as an ordered combination—failed to provide an
inventive concept, because they merely recited a generic computer

338

See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258; Amazon, 838 F.3d at 1269.
See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258–59.
340
See id. at 1262–63; Amazon, 838 F.3d at 1271.
341
See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1263–65.
342
Judge Prost was appointed to Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 2001 by President George W. Bush and served as Minority Chief Counsel,
Deputy Chief Counsel, and Chief Counsel of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
prior to her appointment. Sharon Prost, Chief Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/sharon-prost-chief-judge [https://
perma.cc/ZLJ2-WA6A] (last visited June 26, 2017).
343
See Nos. 2015-1907, 2015-1941, 2015-1958, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2016).
344
Id. slip op. at 6.
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routinely and conventionally performing the abstract idea.345 Thus,
she held the patent invalid.346
Her next decision, another non-precedential decision, was
Smartflash L.L.C. v. Apple Inc.347 There, the court examined a
patent claiming systems relating to “a portable data carrier for
storing and paying for data and to computer systems for providing
access to data to be stored” to determine whether it claimed
patentable subject matter.348 Because the claims invoked a
computer only to execute the abstract idea, Judge Prost concluded
that the claims were directed to an abstract idea.349 Next, Judge
Prost searched for an inventive concept, noting that both Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit precedent had held similar dataprocessing inventions to lack an inventive concept because the
activity was routine.350 Second, she analogized the instant
invention to the invention in Ultramercial, and distinguished it
from DDR.351 Lastly, Judge Prost concluded that the “interfaces,”
“program stores,” and “processors” were all generic computer
components and therefore did not supply an inventive concept.352
Thus, the patent was invalid because it was directed to an abstract
idea and lacked an inventive concept.353
A few weeks after the Smartflash decision, Judge Prost
released two decisions in related cases: Intellectual Ventures I
L.L.C. v. Erie Indemnity Co. and Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v.
Capital One Financial Corp. In Erie Indemnity, the court
considered the validity of U.S. Patent No. 6,510,434 (“‘434
Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,546,002 (“‘002 Patent).354 The
Capital One Financial court, on the other hand, evaluated the
345

See id. slip op. at 8.
See id. slip op. at 9.
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See id. slip op. at 10.
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See id. slip op. at 11.
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See Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed.
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validity of U.S Patent No. 7,984,081 (“‘081 Patent”) and the
‘002 Patent.355
In Erie Indemnity, the ‘434 Patent claimed “methods and
apparatuses that use an index to locate desired information in a
computer database.”356 First, under Alice step one, Judge Prost
noted that the type of activity claimed has been long prevalent and
existed long before computers.357 Next, Judge Prost compared
Intellectual Ventures’ claimed invention to those found directed to
an abstract idea in In re TLI Communications, Content Extraction,
and BASCOM, finding them to be similar.358 Finally the judge
rejected Intellectual Ventures’ argument that, similar to Enfish,
their invention improved computer functionality and held the
claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.359
Judge Prost then searched for an inventive concept under Alice
step two. The judge first rejected Intellectual Ventures’ argument
that using a certain computer language provided an inventive
concept.360 She opined that limiting the invention to a specific,
well-known computer language was the same as limiting it to a
technological environment, which does not provide an inventive
concept.361 The judge then examined the remaining limitations
individually and as an ordered combination, and found them to be
“well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities.”362 Thus,
the ‘434 Patent was invalid.363
Judge Prost then examined the ‘002 Patent, which claimed
“systems and methods for accessing a user’s remotely stored data
and files,” and ultimately held the ‘002 Patent invalid.364 Judge
355

See Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1334
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See id. at 1327–28 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (2016)).
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Prost first noted that remote access and retrieval of user data is an
“age-old practice” existing before computers.365 Second, Judge
Prost rejected Intellectual Ventures’ argument that the claimed
mobile interface solved a problem unique to the field, opining that
the mobile interface “does little more than provide a generic
technological environment to allow users to access information,”
which was insufficient to cause the invention to be non-abstract.366
After concluding that the claimed invention was directed to an
abstract idea, Judge Prost moved to determining whether the
claimed invention contained an inventive concept.367 Judge Prost
concluded that using a mobile interface and pointers to retrieve
user information merely implemented the abstract idea on a
generic computer.368 Furthermore, because the other components
and steps recited in the claimed invention were generic or
conventional, Judge Prost held that the claimed invention did not
contain an inventive concept, and therefore the patent
was invalid.369
In the related case, Capital One Financial, the court considered
the validity of the ‘081 Patent, which claimed “methods, systems,
and apparatuses for dynamically managing eXtensible Markup
Language (‘XML’) data.”370 Under Alice step one, Judge Prost
found the ‘081 Patent’s invention similar to the inventions found
directed to an abstract idea in Content Extraction, Intellectual
Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One Bank (USA),371 and Electric
Power Group.372 As Judge Prost did in Erie Indemnity, she rejected
Intellectual Ventures’ argument that limiting the application to a
certain computer language caused the claimed invention to not be
directed to an abstract idea, opining that limiting an application to
a technological environment did not transform an abstract idea into
365

Id. at 1330.
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367
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See id. at 1331–32.
370
Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
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See 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Capital One Fin., 850 F.3d at 1340 (citations omitted).
366

158

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

a non-abstract idea.373 Finally, Judge Prost concluded that despite
that the specific structures within the claimed invention provided
some particularity, the “underlying concept” was still directed to
an abstract idea.374 Thus, Judge Prost turned to Alice step two to
investigate whether the claimed invention contained an inventive
concept.375 The judge examined the steps and components recited
in the claims both individually and as an ordered combination, and
concluded that they were generic and conventional.376 Thus, Judge
Prost held the ‘081 Patent invalid.377
ii. Summary of Judge Prost’s Approach
The four cases Judge Prost authored did not clearly define a
methodology she employed to determine whether a patent claimed
patentable subject matter. However, this Note recognized some
trends. In her first two cases, under Alice step one, Judge Prost
used her own judgement to determine whether something was
abstract, but in Erie Indemnity and Capital One Financial, she
used the approach implemented by Judges Chen and Taranto—
asking whether the practice was long prevalent—and also
compared the instant claimed invention to precedent.378 Judge
Prost was relatively consistent under the second step of Alice. In all
four of her decisions, she followed the same approach as most
other judges this Note addresses: asking whether the components
and steps claimed were generic or conventional.379 However, she
also implemented other approaches such as comparing the instant

373
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case to precedent.380 Therefore, although some trends were
recognizable, her approach was not completely defined.
e. Judge Alan D. Lourie
i. Judge Lourie’s Decisions
Judge Lourie381 authored two decisions determining patentable
subject matter eligibility: Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C. and
Evolutionary Intelligence L.L.C. v. Sprint Nextel Corp. In
Ultramercial, Judge Lourie considered whether a patent claiming
“a method for distributing copyrighted media products over the
Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted media product
at no cost in exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the
advertiser pays for the copyrighted content” claimed patentable
subject matter.382 Judge Lourie held the claimed invention directed
to the abstract idea of “using advertising as an exchange or
currency.”383 He then found no inventive concept because the
claims merely recited routinely and conventionally implementing
the abstract idea.384 Thus, Judge Lourie held the patent invalid.385
Most recently, in the non-precedential Evolutionary
Intelligence decision, Judge Lourie evaluated whether a patent
claiming “systems and methods for allowing computers to process
data that are dynamically modified based upon external-to-thedevice information” claimed patentable subject matter.386 In his
Alice step-one analysis, Judge Lourie compared the case at hand to
380

See Smartflash, slip op. at 11–13.
Judge Lourie was appointed by President George H. W. Bush in 1990 and was Vice
President, Corporate Patents and Trademarks, and Associate General Counsel of
SmithKline Beecham Corporation prior to his appointment. Alan D. Lourie, Circuit
Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov
/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/9D8T-EX2L] (last visited Sept.
19, 2017).
382
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precedent, finding it similar to Affinity Labs of Texas, L.L.C. v.
Amazon.com Inc. and Electric Power Group, which both held
similar inventions were directed to an abstract idea, and
distinguishable from Enfish.387 Therefore, he held the claimed
invention was directed to an abstract idea.388 Under the Alice steptwo inquiry, Judge Lourie noted that Evolutionary Intelligence had
conceded that the claimed containers, registers, and gateways “are
‘conventional and routine’ structures,” and further noted that, when
taken both individually and as an ordered combination, the
elements were conventional.389 Therefore, he held that the claimed
invention lacked an inventive concept and the patent
was invalid.390
ii. Summary of Judge Lourie’s Approach
Judge Lourie’s two decisions did not demonstrate that he has
an exact methodology to determine whether a claim is directed to
an abstract idea. In Ultramercial, he pointed to a lack of concrete
form, while in Evolutionary Intelligence he compared the instant
case to the Federal Circuit’s precedent.391 However, as with many
other Federal Circuit judges, Judge Lourie consistently approached
the Alice step-two inquiry by examining whether the claimed steps
and components were conventional or generic.392 Therefore,
although no consistent approach for Judge Lourie for step one was
apparent, he did consistently approach Alice step two.
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See id. slip op. at 4 (comparing the instant case to Affinity Labs of Tex., L.L.C. v.
Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v.
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f. Judge Pauline Newman
i. Judge Newman’s Decisions
Judge Newman393 has authored two decisions, one of which
was non-precedential. Judge Newman first decided Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,394 which considered whether
a patent claiming “the use of a conventional web browser Back and
Forward navigational functionalities without data loss in an online
application consisting of dynamically generated web pages”
claimed patentable subject matter.395 Judge Newman first held that
the claimed invention was directed to an abstract idea because
Internet Patent Corp. provided in the specification that the “most
important aspect” of the invention was that it maintained the state
of the prior page when a user changed pages.396 Judge Newman
categorized this aspect as a result, rather than specific steps to
accomplish a result, and therefore the claimed invention was
directed to an abstract idea.397 Under step two, because Internet
Patents Corp. admitted in its specification that the Back and
Forward functionality was conventional and the specification
described it as “well-known” and “common,” Judge Newman did
not find an inventive concept, and therefore held the
patent invalid.398
Next, Judge Newman decided Trading Technologies
International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., a non-precedential decision where
the court considered whether a patent claiming a method and
system for electronically trading financial instruments, such as
stocks and bonds, claimed patentable subject matter.399 Under
393
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Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the revision of the Paris
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.uscourts.gov/judges/pauline-newman-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/DYU8-SGC5] (last
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Alice step one, Judge Newman affirmed the district court’s
reasoning and concluded that, like the Enfish invention, the instant
claim was directed to improving computers’ functionality.400
Because Judge Newman held that the claimed invention was not
directed to an abstract idea, the court did not reach Alice step two,
and the court held the patent not invalid.401
ii. Summary of Judge Newman’s Approach
Judge Newman’s approach was not clear from these two
decisions for two reasons. First, she did not take a similar approach
under Alice step one in the two cases.402 Second, because Judge
Newman held the patent in Trading Technologies was not directed
to an abstract idea, she did not reach the second step of the Alice
test.403 Therefore, there was only one data point on her approach
under that step, which this Note was therefore unable to draw a
conclusion from.
III.

LITIGATION STRATEGY AND PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DIRECTION

A. Litigator’s Strategy for Briefs and Arguments
Part of a litigator’s attractiveness to a client is not only his or
her knowledge of the law, but also his or her ability to persuasively
advocate for the client. A litigator should know the arguments that
judges have previously found to be the most persuasive to increase
the prospects for successful litigation. In this Part, this Note
outlines how a litigator should argue the patentable subject matter
issue in light of the foregoing analysis discerning the
judges’ methodologies.
The first step is to recognize who the judges are and which
arguments they have previously found persuasive or not
400

See id. slip op. at 8–9 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
1336, 1339 (2016)).
401
See id. slip op. at 9.
402
See supra Section II.B.2.f.i.
403
See Trading Techs. Int’l, slip op. at 9.

2017]

PATENTLY INSANE FOR PATENTS

163

persuasive. For example, if the panel includes Judges Chen and
Taranto, the litigator should argue differently than if the panel
includes Hughes and Stoll. If the panel consists of judges whose
methodologies are not as defined as Judges Chen, Taranto,
Hughes, and Stoll, a litigator should look to the judge’s decisions
as analyzed above, and then also consider other factors such as the
technology claimed. That way, a litigator may identify the more
specific approach of that panel for a specific technology.
1. Alice Step One
Litigators can increase their chances of obtaining their desired
outcome by arguing points the empaneled judges have historically
found persuasive. Some Federal Circuit judges ask whether the
claimed invention has been a long prevalent practice, such as
Judges Chen and Taranto.404 Therefore, to argue more persuasively
before these judges, a litigator must convince the judge that the
practice is either new or long prevalent, depending on the side the
litigator represents.
How does a litigator persuade the judge that the practice
claimed in the patent is not a long prevalent practice? The preeminent example is DDR. The DDR court found that the claimed
invention addressed a new problem: visitors to a website leaving
the website via a hyperlink to purchase a product on another
website, and thereby reducing the original website’s visitor
traffic.405 The practice was not long prevalent because the internet
was relatively new and the practice could not have existed
beforehand.406 Therefore, if a litigator seeks to convince the judges
that it is not a long prevalent practice, he or she may argue that the
practice is new because the problem it solves did not
previously exist.407
Furthermore, a litigator may argue that a practice has not been
long prevalent by differentiating the instant invention from similar,
404

See supra Sections II.B.1.a–b.
See DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
406
See id.
407
See id.
405
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long prevalent practices. The litigator could, for example, point out
that, like in DDR, the invention is for a completely new platform or
that the process is different than the long prevalent practice.408
Conversely, a litigator who endeavors to invalidate the patent
as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter could argue that the
problem has existed for a long time, and that changing the platform
in which the problem exists does not change the problem itself. For
example, in DDR, the dissent argued that the analogous long
prevalent practice was a kiosk within a larger store, and therefore,
the practice of keeping someone in the store while purchasing
something from someone else was long prevalent.409 However, the
majority rejected this argument as not analogous, because when
someone walks up to a kiosk in a store they are not instantly
transported to a different location, as occurs when a website visitor
clicks on a hyperlink.410 For a litigator to successfully argue this
point, he or she must identify the same practice, not a similar
practice, and show that it has been previously performed for a long
time. For instance, Judge Chen identified the data acquisition and
analysis process in Content Extraction as long prevalent because
humans have always collected and analyzed data in that way.411
Other judges, such as Judges Hughes and Stoll, primarily
compared the instant invention to the Supreme Court’s and Federal
Circuit’s precedent.412 For these judges, the litigator should focus
on arguing just that: whether the instant case is similar or different
from precedent. If a litigator is arguing before a panel including
these two judges, the litigator should argue that the invention at
issue is similar to or different from precedent, especially the
Supreme Court’s precedent in Bilski, Diehr, and Alice. For
example, Judge Hughes analogized the claimed invention in Planet

408

See id.
See id. at 1258.
410
See id.
411
See Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
412
See supra Sections II.B.1.c–d.
409
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Bingo to the inventions in Alice and Bilski.413 A prudent litigator
arguing against invalidity could also analogize the Federal
Circuit’s precedent in Enfish or DDR, while litigators seeking to
prove invalidity could distinguish those inventions.
2. Alice Step Two
The Federal Circuit judges have taken similar approaches to
determining whether the claimed invention contains an inventive
concept under the second step of the Alice test.414 The question is:
what is different in the claimed invention as compared to the
abstract idea? To put it another way, if you remove the abstract
idea from the claimed invention, is there something left that would
constitute patent-eligible subject matter? The Federal Circuit
judges’ decisions that this Note examined ask whether the process
claimed in the patent, including the components described therein,
is conventional.415 Therefore, litigators proving that the patent is
not invalid should argue that there is something different either in
the steps themselves or the order of the steps from the conventional
practice. For example, the BASCOM court held that filtering at a
remote and centralized location, as opposed to at the users’
location, constituted an inventive concept because the filtering was
done out of order as compared to the conventional process.416
Litigators could focus on the uniqueness of the invention and
explain what is different about the step itself or the order of the
steps from the abstract idea.
In addition to the claimed steps themselves, the Federal Circuit
judges also look at the components described in the steps.417 If the
components, such as computers, interfaces, etc., are special or
different in some way, an inventive concept may therein lie.
Litigators could therefore not only look at the steps, but also the
413

See Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, No. 2013-1663, slip op. at 5 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
26, 2014) (discussing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) and Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356–57 (2014)).
414
See supra Section II.B.
415
See supra Section II.B.
416
See BASCOM Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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See supra Section II.B.
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computers and other components included in those steps. If there is
something unique about those components, the litigator could
emphasize it in his or her brief arguing against invalidity.
Litigators may also persuade judges through policy
arguments.418 Litigators seeking to prove that the patent is not
invalid could argue that the claims are narrowed enough such that
the patent would not preempt the basic tools of scientific work. For
example, in BASCOM, Judge Chen noted that the patent claimed
only a single method of filtering content, not the general idea of
filtering content.419 However, the litigators should avoid arguing
that the invention’s application is limited to a technological
environment by the patentee. The court is not receptive to this
argument, having found that a patent holder artificially limiting the
application to a certain technological environment is insufficient to
convey an inventive concept.420
On the contrary, litigators seeking to prove invalidity for
claiming patent-ineligible subject matter could argue that the
claimed invention is the same as the abstract idea and any
deviations the claimed invention might contain from the abstract
idea are insignificant. For example, in BASCOM the litigator
seeking to invalidate the patent could argue that the order of the
steps does not matter because it is still the abstract idea of filtering
internet content. Further, the litigators could argue that the
components described in the steps are generic. For example, the
litigator could argue that a claimed computer that the patent holder
418

See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)) (invalidating a patent because, inter alia,
it would preempt “basic tools of scientific and technological work” and “‘impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting the primary object
of patent law” (quoting Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc, 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2116 (2013))); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293 (2012); BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (finding an inventive concept because,
inter alia, the invention would not preempt every way of filtering content, only a single
specific way).
419
See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350.
420
See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l
Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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contends is unique is merely a generic computer or that it is an
industry standard computer.
Furthermore, the litigator seeking invalidation could argue that
a patent on this invention would preempt the basic tools of
scientific work, therefore hindering scientific progress and
thwarting the patent system’s constitutional purpose. For instance,
the litigator could show that the invention is not limited to an
embodiment and could be executed through various mediums, such
as a computer or telephone.
Knowing the judges’ methodology in determining whether a
patent claims patent-eligible subject matter empowers attorneys
whether they are arguing for or against patentability to more
persuasively argue before the Federal Circuit. Depending on the
panel’s make up, litigators can now tune their arguments to those
judges. For example, if the panel includes Judges Chen and
Taranto, the litigators could debate whether the practice has been
long prevalent under the first step of the Alice test. On the contrary,
if the panel includes Judges Hughes and Stoll, the litigators could
instead compare the instant invention to precedent. Under the
second step of the Alice inquiry, the judges share a similar
approach, but some judges may be slightly different. For example,
Judge Chen occasionally asks whether the claims are sufficiently
limited in addition to inquiring whether the steps, taken both
individually and as an ordered combination, and the components
recited therein are conventional or generic.421 Thus, through the
analysis above, litigators will more persuasively argue before the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
B. Where Is the Federal Circuit Going?
1. The Federal Circuit Judges’ Directions
The Federal Circuit judges have not had too many
opportunities to decide cases regarding patentable subject matter.
A few judges have authored multiple decisions and developed a
concrete methodology to deciding them. On the other hand, several
421

See supra Section II.B.1.a.
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judges on the Federal Circuit have written one or zero decisions on
the topic. In the long term, all the Federal Circuit judges will
author decisions and begin to develop their approach. But, what
will that approach be?
The judges are most divided on deciding whether the claimed
invention is directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the
Alice inquiry.422 However, the two prevailing methodologies—
asking whether the claimed invention is a long prevalent practice
and comparing the claimed invention to precedent—result in the
same outcome.423 The purpose of noting the difference is to more
persuasively argue to the judges who employ one methodology or
the other. For example, while examining a patent claiming a
hedging process, a judge asking whether a practice has been long
prevalent will note that hedging is a long prevalent practice and
will accordingly hold the patent directed to an abstract idea. A
judge comparing the patent claiming a hedging process will look to
the Supreme Court’s precedent in Bilski and find that, like the
patent in Bilski claiming hedging, the patent is directed to an
abstract idea. But, the Supreme Court in Bilski held the hedging
process directed to an abstract idea because it was a long prevalent
practice.424 Therefore, either way, the Federal Circuit is asking the
same question in either a more or less direct fashion.
Under the second step of the Alice test the judges who have
decided upon a methodology have been relatively consistent with
each other. Indeed, the decisions by judges who have written only
a few decisions, but have not fully defined their methodology,
implement the same approach as the judges who have a more
defined method: asking whether the claimed components and steps
taken individually or as an ordered combination are conventional
or generic. However, other judges do consider other factors.425 Yet,
those other factors are simply other ways to ask the same question:
whether the patent, if found not invalid, will preempt the basic
tools of scientific progress. Therefore, at most, there are two
422
423
424
425

See generally supra Section II.B.
See generally supra Section II.B.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
See supra Section II.B.2.
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questions to consider under the second step of Alice: (1) whether
the components and steps are conventional or generic, and (2)
whether the patent will preempt the tools of scientific
development. The judges who are still developing their approach
or have not written any decisions will likely follow suit and ask at
least the first of these inquiries, and possibly the second, because it
gets to the heart of patent law: promoting scientific progress.
2. The Federal Circuit’s Direction
Besides the judges’ approaches, substantively, where is the
Federal Circuit heading regarding patentable subject matter? The
Federal Circuit is expanding its definition of patentable subject
matter to stay current with rapidly advancing technology.426 While,
as noted by the Court in Bilski, the Court previously would likely
have found software and business method inventions unpatentable,
the court is adjusting to new technology.427 Indeed, the Alice
decision made it more difficult to obtain a software patent, because
it eliminated the patentee’s ability to patent general ideas
embodied in software on a computer, and instead required the
patentee to focus on the specific application of those ideas.
Furthermore, this effect is not harmful overall because patents
claiming ideas would stymie scientific progress.428 The Alice
decision did not remove all possibility of a software patent, but
instead created a two-step test that attempts to eliminate patents
claiming ideas, while allowing specific applications of those ideas
to obtain patent protection.429
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence likewise demonstrates this
expansion. In DDR the Federal Circuit held a function on a website
was not invalid because the practice and problem solved were

426

See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
See id.
428
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012))
(invalidating a patent claiming a judicial exception because it would “‘impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting the primary object of
patent law”).
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See id. at 2355–57.
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unique to the internet and not long-prevalent.430 In essence, the
DDR court began the process of allowing software patents when
the court had previously invalidated any such patents.431 Then,
Enfish expanded the category of patentable subject matter to
include computer programs that improve the functioning of
computers.432 In other words, patents that improve computer
functions, not just solve a new problem, are found not invalid.433
Moreover, in BASCOM, the court expanded what is patentable to
include conventional or generic pieces if they are ordered in an
unconventional way.434 Thus, the court added computer
components to steps that were organized in a different way than
the abstract idea to the acceptable software patents, once again
enlarging the realm of patentable software.435 In sum, the Federal
Circuit is finding new ways within the bounds imposed by the
Alice test to find patentable subject matter and will likely continue
to do so. As the Alice court stated, the precise contours of an
abstract idea are not defined.436 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has
leeway to define the judicial exception through its case law.
CONCLUSION
Since the Alice decision, patentable subject matter eligibility
has generated much uncertainty among attorneys and resulted in
mass invalidation of patents.437 Consequently, many scholars have
tried to identify how the court makes such decisions as well as
posit theories as to how the court should make those decisions.438
However, through a different approach, this Note identifies trends
within the Federal Circuit judges’ decisions to alleviate some of
430

See DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.
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that uncertainty.439 This Note has shown how four judges have a
consistent approach to deciding these cases440 and how trends are
identifiable in several other judges’ decisions.441 With this
knowledge, litigators can better persuade the Federal Circuit either
to invalidate or not invalidate a patent.442 Furthermore, the
individual judges’ approaches shed light on where the Federal
Circuit is headed as a whole.443

439
440
441
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443

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.2.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.B.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARIZING TABLES
Appendix A: Consistent Federal Circuit Judges Summary Table
Judge
Judge Raymond
T. Chen
Judge Richard
G. Taranto

Judge Todd
M. Hughes
Judge Kara
F. Stoll

Alice Step One Factors
Whether the claimed
invention has been long
prevalent.

Alice Step Two Factors
(1) Whether the claimed
steps are conventional and
components are generic.
(2) Whether the claims are
sufficiently limited as to not
preempt the basic tools of
scientific progress.

Compares the claimed
invention to precedent.

Whether the claimed steps
are conventional and
components are generic.
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Appendix B: Federal Circuit Judges Developing Methodologies
Summary Table
Judge:
Judge S. Jay
Plager

Alice Step One Factors:
Only one decision,
therefore, there is no trend.

Alice Step Two Factors:
(1) Whether the claimed
steps are conventional and
components claimed are
generic.
(2) Compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.

Judge Jimmie
V. Reyna

Judge William
C. Bryson

No distinct trend, but has
considered in varying
combinations:

No distinct trend, but has
considered in varying
combinations:

(1) Whether the steps are
conventional and
components claimed are
generic.

(1) Whether the claimed
invention is a way to
achieve a result or the result
itself.

(2) Compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.

(2) Whether the claimed
invention has been long
prevalent.

(3) Whether a human could
perform the claimed
process without a computer.

(3) Compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.

Consistently compares the
instant claimed invention to
precedent, but has also
considered in varying
combinations:

Consistently considers
whether the claimed steps
are conventional and
components are generic, but
also compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.

(1) Whether the claimed
invention has been long
prevalent.
(2) Whether the claimed
invention is a way to
achieve a result or the result
itself.
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(3) Whether the claims are
sufficiently limited as to not
preempt the basic tools of
scientific progress.
Judge Sharon
Prost

No distinct trend, but
regularly:
(1) Relies on her own
judgment.
(2) Asks whether the
claimed invention was long
prevalent.

Consistently considers
whether the claimed steps
are conventional and
components are generic, but
also occasionally compares
the instant claimed
invention to precedent.

(3) Compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.
Judge Alan
D. Lourie

No distinct trend, but
regularly:
(1) Considers whether the
claimed invention has a
concrete form.

Constantly considers
whether the claimed steps
are conventional and
components are generic.

(2) Compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.
Judge Pauline
Newman

No distinct trend, but
regularly:
(1) Considers whether the
claimed invention is a way
to achieve a result or the
result itself.
(2) Compares the instant
claimed invention to
precedent.

Only one decision,
therefore, there is no
distinct trend.

